THE path is now clear for nine men once accused of murdering businesswoman Vindra Naipaul-Coolman to collect a combined total of close to $20 million from the State, after the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council shut down the Attorney General’s final bid to challenge the award.
In refusing special leave to appeal, on February 26, the London-based court effectively brought to an end the State’s attempts to overturn a default judgment first entered in the High Court and later reinstated by the Court of Appeal.
The nine men—Shervon Peters, Devon Peters, Anthony Gloster, Joel Fraser, Ronald Armstrong, Keida Garcia, Jameel Garcia, Marlon Trimmingham and Antonio Charles—were charged with murder in 2007, months after Naipaul-Coolman was kidnapped from her Lange Park home in December 2006.
Devon Peters
Shervon Peters
Joel Fraser
Antonio Charles
Marlon
Trimmingham
Marlon
Trimmingham
Keida Garcia
Ronald Armstrong
They spent approximately ten years on remand before being acquitted in 2016.
In 2020, they filed a civil claim for malicious prosecution against the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, contending that the criminal proceedings had been instituted without reasonable and probable cause and with malice. The State did not file a defence within the time prescribed by the Civil Proceedings Rules.
Malicious prosecution
As a result, in 2021, Justice Joan Charles granted permission for default judgment on liability. The matter then proceeded to an assessment of damages. In January 2023, after considering the length of the men’s incarceration—approximately a decade—and the impact on their lives, Justice Charles assessed damages at just under $20 million.
The judge’s ruling meant that absent a successful challenge, the State was liable to compensate the men for what stood as an undefended claim of malicious prosecution.
Each of them—represented by attorneys from Freedom Law Chambers, led by Anand Ramlogan, SC—is to receive close to $2 million.
In March 2023, the Office of the Attorney General applied to set aside the default judgment. The application was advanced on three main grounds: alleged improper service of the claim form, wrongful exercise of discretion in granting default judgment, and an asserted lack of jurisdiction to enter judgment with damages to be assessed.
Justice Charles upheld the complaint of improper service and set aside the default judgment.
Then the men appealed.
By majority, Justices Nolan Bereaux and Mark Mohammed allowed the appeal and reinstated the default judgment, restoring the near-$20 million award. Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh, now Chief Justice, dissented.
In written reasons issued subsequently, Justice Bereaux held that the application to set aside did not constitute a “final decision” within the meaning of Section 109(1)(a) of the Constitution, and therefore did not give rise to an appeal as of right to the Privy Council. He reasoned that had the State succeeded, the matter would simply have returned to the High Court for the filing of a defence and continuation of the proceedings.
“On this basis therefore, the application to set aside was not a final decision,” he wrote.
No excuse for delay
The majority had also rejected the State’s submission that the case raised issues of “great general or public importance” under Section 109(2)(a). The AG’s Office had argued that questions concerning service of process on the State and the court’s authority to set aside default judgments warranted clarification by the Privy Council.
In addressing that contention, the court referred to the Privy Council’s decision in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Universal Projects Ltd, which affirmed that a court’s inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent the express provisions of procedural rules.
Justice Bereaux had also criticised of the State’s delay, noting there was “no excuse” for permitting a claim said to be bound to fail to proceed to default judgment undefended and then waiting years to challenge it—and only after public concern arose over the size of the award.
Chief Justice Boodoosingh, in dissent, took the view that the application to set aside could not be divorced from the earlier judgment on liability and therefore fell within the scope of a final decision.
He further considered that the matter engaged issues of public importance, observing that the award represented a substantial sum of public funds in a malicious prosecution case—a cause of action traditionally regarded as difficult to establish against the State.
In November of last year, the Court of Appeal formally refused the State’s conditional leave to appeal to the Privy Council.
The State then petitioned the Privy Council directly for special leave. With the application being refused, the default judgment initially granted by Justice Charles can no longer be challenged.